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Abstract
The idea that gauge theory has ‘surplus’ structure poses a puzzle: in one much discussed
sense, this structure is redundant; but on the other hand, it is also widely held to play an
essential role in the theory. In this paper, we employ category-theoretic tools to illuminate an
aspect of this puzzle. We precisify what is meant by ‘surplus’ structure by means of functorial
comparisons with equivalence classes of gauge fields, and then show that such structure is
essential for any theory that represents a rich collection of physically relevant fields which are
‘local’ in nature.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a movement to view scientific theories as categories, and to
analyse them using the tools of category theory.1 One set of motivations for this approach
1See e.g. [Halvorson, 2012; Halvorson and Tsementzis, 2015; Teh and Tsementzis, 2017; Weatherall, 2016a,b] and
references therein.
1
stems from considerations about how best to represent scientific theories from a philosophical
perspective.2 For instance, if scientific theories are thought of as—in some sense—collections
of models, then we might have reason to consider inter-model relationships to be an important
part of the ‘structural’ content of a theory. As such, advocates of the categorical approach
recommend it because it not only allows us to clearly and precisely formulate the ‘structure’
of a theory (i.e. of its collection of models), but also operates with a notion of structure that
is flexible enough to incorporate inter-model relationships. Furthermore, once such structure
has been represented, the framework naturally takes it into account when formalising inter-
theoretic comparisons such as ‘theoretical equivalence’ and ‘one theory having more structure
than another’.
An important class of theories for testing the fruitfulness of categorical methods is ‘gauge
theories’, by which we mean theories of ‘Yang-Mills type’, such as electromagnetism. This is
because such theories provide a paradigmatic scenario in which comparisons of structure between
two theories (or two formulations of a theory) naturally arise.3 More specifically, it is typically
held that gauge theories admit of redundancies in the following sense: locally, a theory whose
models use gauge fields is ‘empirically equivalent’ to a corresponding theory whose models use
only gauge equivalence classes of such fields. Thus, there is an intuitive sense in which the
former theory possesses ‘surplus’ (i.e. structure over and above the gauge equivalence classes)
compared to the latter theory. Illuminating and precisifying this sense is a task for which the
categorical approach seems ideally suited.
The above notion of ‘surplus’ structure has received much attention within the philosophical
literature.4 An equally intriguing aspect of such structure, albeit one that has received less
attention, is the idea that despite its redundancy in the above sense, it also plays an indispensable
role in the theory’s formulation. For instance, it is commonly believed that gauge fields are
essential for formulating classical gauge theory as a ‘local’ field theory (in a sense that we will
make precise in Section 4).5 This leads to an apparent puzzle: How can a ‘redundancy’ be an
essential feature of a theory?
Although it is certainly not obvious that the categorical approach has anything to say
about this puzzle, we will argue in this paper that it does. In particular, we will show that
using categorical tools to precisify ‘surplus’ gives us the resources to understand why such
‘surplus’ plays a representationally significant role in the theory. From a broader perspective,
we take our work to be a contribution to both the philosophy of scientific theories literature
and the philosophy of gauge theory literature. It contributes to the former by showing that
for a large class of scientific theories, namely field theories, it is important to extend what
we call the ‘theories as categories’ paradigm to the ‘theories as functors’ paradigm in order
to fully accommodate inter-model relationships (in this case: relationships specifying how the
local systems represented by the theory can determine global systems) which are relevant for
gauge theory. (We say more about why this is important in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.) It
contributes to the latter by showing that our intuitive understanding of ‘surplus’ is ambiguous
and its disambiguation rests on the precise standard of sameness that one chooses for a scientific
2Note that we do not claim any originality for this approach on the part of the philosophical literature; the general
idea of ‘representing theories as categories’ has been common within theoretical physics for a long time, e.g. in the
applications of noncommutative geometry [Connes, 1994] to physics.
3We note that the term ‘gauge’ is used in many different ways within the philosophical literature; for instance,
some authors use ‘gauge’ to describe any theory with representationally redundant structure. Our stricter notion of
‘gauge’ is standard within the high-energy theory literature, and is appropriate given that ‘Yang-Mills type’ theories
are our concern in the present article.
4See for instance [Earman, 2004; Healey, 2007; Redhead, 2003] and the discussion in [Belot et al., 2009].
5This view is widely held, but for an explicit and mathematically sophisticated presentation, see [Schreiber, 2016].
For a less formal point of view, see also the discussion of ‘stacks’ in [Witten, 2010].
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theory; furthermore, only one of these choices will yield a satisfying resolution of the puzzle.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the general idea of repre-
senting a scientific theory as a category. In Section 3, we then apply the ‘theories as categories’
framework to an idealised version of U(1) gauge theory, where we temporarily (i) restrict our
focus to contractible manifolds, and (ii) ignore the local nature of fields. Within this framework,
we offer an analysis of ‘surplus’ that captures standard physical intuitions about what consti-
tutes the (locally) redundant structure of a gauge theory. For completeness, we then briefly
contrast our analysis with that of Weatherall [2016a,b], which investigates a different concept
of ‘surplus’ and thus does not capture the intuitions that we are after.
In Section 4, we remove assumptions (i) and (ii) by representing theories as functors instead
of as categories. We then resolve our earlier puzzle by showing that from the perspective
of this more realistic notion of a theory, ‘surplus’ (in the sense picked out in Section 3) is
necessary in order to accommodate a rich set of physically relevant models while simultaneously
representing the ‘locality’ of fields. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding morals for the project
of representing scientific theories categorically and points out an intriguing connection between
our argument and a highly influential approach to mathematical classification that has its roots
in the groundbreaking work of Grothendieck [5960].
2 Theories as Categories
We now describe the general framework for representing a theory as a category.6 Section 2.1
discusses an inter-model relationship that will be of interest to us: the ‘representational equiva-
lence’ of two models, meaning that they (accurately) represent the same possible states of affairs.
We also discuss several different kinds of categories that one might use to encode representa-
tional equivalence. Section 2.2 then reviews how functors can be used to formulate equivalence
and inequivalence relations between theories.
2.1 Relations between models
Recall that a model of a theory is a structure that represents a system that is possible according
to the theory.7 For instance, if we are concerned with a (classical) field theory, then a system will
be encoded by some particular field configuration that satisfies the theory’s equations of motion.
In the present categorical formalisation of a scientific theory T , such models will be the objects
of the category CT that one is using to represent T .
8 In order to fully specify CT , one also needs
to define the morphisms (or arrows) of this category, which can be taken to represent various
kinds of inter-model relationships. In this section, we will focus on the inter-model relationships
represented by isomorphisms (i.e. invertible morphisms): Models of CT that are related by
an isomorphism are taken to represent the same possible systems, despite the fact that the
models could be (strictly speaking) distinct objects.9 Furthermore, each distinct isomorphism
specifies a distinct way of transforming one model into another in a manner that preserves its
6In keeping with much of the literature on this subject, we assume that–in this basic case–the relevant categories
are not functor categories, which would require us to antecedently define domain and co-domain categories of models.
The case of functor categories will arise in what we call the ‘theories as functors’ paradigm of Section 4.
7How these structures represent physical systems is a vexing question which we will not address here. See
[Frigg and Nguyen, 2016] for an overview of options currently available in the literature.
8For convenience, we use 1-categories to represent scientific theories throughout this paper, but our points are
easily extended to theories that require an n-categorical formulation.
9This is motivated by the fact that isomorphic models in a category C have the ‘same structure’ (from the perspec-
tive of C), and once this structure has been chosen to capture what, and how, the model represents, then isomorphic
models can (albeit not must) be taken to be representationally equivalent.
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representational content; such information (about the different ways relating representationally
equivalent models) will play a vital role in the analysis of Section 4. As we discuss there and
in the conclusion, the isomorphisms of a theory—thought of as a category—can also contribute
to the representational capacities of a theory, namely by representing the different ways in
which the systems represented by the objects (models) are related to one another (e.g. as local
subsystems combining into global systems).
An elementary type of category of models, then, is one in which the only inter-model re-
lationship encoded is representational equivalence, i.e. one in which the only morphisms are
isomorphisms. Such categories are called groupoids. In what follows, we will have reason to
consider three kinds of groupoids. First, a groupoid is a categorical set S if and only if its only
morphisms are identity morphisms.10 Each distinct model in the category is thereby taken to
represent a different possible system. Second, a groupoid is a categorical equivalence relation
E if and only if between any two objects A, B in E there is at most one morphism in the
morphism set hom(A,B).11 For categorical equivalence relations, clusters of objects connected
by morphisms fall into the same representational ‘equivalence class’, and thereby represent the
same system. Finally, we will also consider groupoids that are neither categorical sets nor
categorical equivalence relations. Like the latter, such groupoids contain disconnected clusters
of representationally equivalent objects, but in this most general case, there may be multiple
morphisms between (not necessarily distinct) objects within each cluster—these morphisms rep-
resent the different ways in which representationally equivalent models can be transformed into
one another.
2.2 Relations between theories
Having represented a scientific theory as a category, one can then treat a theory as being itself
an object of a category: the category of theories. A simple category that lends itself to this
purpose is the 2-category Cat whose objects are 1-categories, whose 1-morphisms are functors
between categories, and whose 2-morphisms (morphisms between 1-morphisms) are natural
transformations between functors. We now explain how to use the morphisms of this category
to describe equivalence and inequivalence relations between theories.
2.2.1 Equivalence
Just as we previously used morphisms within a 1-category to describe the standard of sameness
for models within a theory, we can use the morphisms of Cat, namely functors, to describe
a standard of sameness for theories. Two options emerge for such a standard: (a) categorical
isomorphism; or (b) categorical equivalence, which includes isomorphism as a special case. Two
(categorically represented) scientific theories CT1 and CT2 are categorically isomorphic if and
only if there exist functors G : CT1 → CT2 and H : CT2 → CT1 such that GH = 1CT2 and
HG = 1CT1 . And they are categorically equivalent if and only if GH
∼= 1CT2 and HG
∼= 1CT1 ;
notice that these ‘quasi-inverse’ functors weaken the equalities in the definition of (a) to natural
isomorphisms.12
10The reason for this nomenclature is that each categorical set can be defined from a set and vice versa: if a theory
has a set of models MT , then we can redescribe this data as the categorical set ST whose objects correspond to
elements of MT and whose morphisms are all and only identities (and conversely, if we have a categorical set we can
‘forget’ the identity morphisms, leaving us with a bare set of objects). In the literature, this sort of groupoid is also
known as a ‘discrete category’.
11Thus, every categorical set is a categorical equivalence relation, but not vice versa.
12Where needed we use ‘∼=’ to denote isomorphism (both ‘natural isomorphism’ as in the above relations between
functors, as well as categorical isomorphism—the meaning will be clear from the context) and ‘≃’ to denote categorical
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We will eventually take up the question of which of these standards best captures equiv-
alence and inequivalence relations between (categorically represented) scientific theories such
as gauge theory. For the moment, let us note that mathematical practice recommends (b) for
methodological reasons: mathematicians generally take it that we should not limit the expres-
sive resources of our standard of sameness by insisting on categorical isomorphism (thereby
assuming that all relevant 2-morphisms are trivial). This is motivated by the fact that there are
cases of categorical equivalence which are not categorical isomorphism. For example, in the case
of ‘Gelfand duality’ one has a category CG of geometric models and a non-isomorphic category
CA of algebraic models: although the objects of these respective categories look very different,
they are mutually interdefinable (albeit only up to isomorphism), and so we would intuitively
still want to say that CG and CA are ‘structurally the same’; the quasi-inverse functors of cate-
gorical equivalence (but not the inverse functors of categorical isomorphism) have precisely the
weakness that allows us to say this.
In the rest of this paper, we will be concerned with a rather more trivial case of a categorical
equivalence that is not an isomorphism. The general form of the case is as follows: (Skel): Given
a groupoid C (and assuming the axiom of choice), one can construct a skeleton category, skC, by
picking an object from each isomorphism class of C and defining skC to be the full subcategory of
C containing all and only these objects. This skeleton is unique up to categorical isomorphism
[Riehl, 2016, p. 43]. It is easy to see that C is categorically equivalent to skC, because the
relevant interdefinability relations are almost trivial.13
Armed with these conceptual tools, we can now pause to reflect on the question of what
is gained by representing theories as groupoids, rather than as sets, of models. Suppose that
we represent our theory as a categorical set of models, and that we choose (a)—i.e. categorical
isomorphism—as our standard of sameness. Then, since the property of being a categorical set
is preserved by (a), and categorical sets and sets are interdefinable, nothing has been gained
by passing from sets to categorical sets. On the other hand, choosing (b)—i.e. categorical
equivalence—as our standard of sameness reveals a novel feature of the categorical approach, as
demonstrated by the following special case of (Skel): Every categorical equivalence relation is
equivalent to its skeleton, which is a categorical set [Barnet-Lamb, 2005, p. 15]. This fact shows
us that the property of ‘being a categorical set’ is not invariant under (b); thus, passing from sets
to categorical sets allows us to take advantage of the representational flexibility afforded by (b).14
For instance, in Section 3, we will consider a gauge theory example in which formulating the
models as a categorical set allows us to pass to a categorically equivalent groupoid (a categorical
equivalence relation) of models which is not a categorical set.
The distinction between the standards of sameness (a) and (b) will be crucial for the work
that we wish to do in this paper. In Section 3, we will deploy this distinction to demonstrate
that the intuitive notion of ‘surplus’ is in fact ambiguous, and the resolution of this ambiguity
turns on whether one adopts (a) or (b). Furthermore, Section 4 argues that we have more than
merely methodological reasons to adopt (b): Within the context of gauge theory, (b) is part of
an explanation of why ‘surplus’ can play the representational role that it does.
Let us stress that all that we have said so far concerns when two (categorically represented)
theories are formally equivalent to one another. The further question of when these theories
are equivalent tout court (or ‘theoretically equivalent’) clearly turns on how these formal repre-
sentations should be interpreted. We do not wish to take a stand on ‘how to interpret physical
equivalence.
13Note that while the algebraic data of a category and its skeleton are equivalent, geometric properties (such as
smoothness) are not in general preserved when one passes to the skeleton.
14Turning this point on its head, one might also use it to justify categorical equivalence as a standard of sameness:
if one sticks to categorical isomorphism—which does preserve the property of being a categorical set—then one loses
the distinctive flavor of a categorical formulation.
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theories’ or on sufficient conditions for theoretical equivalence here. For our purposes it suffices
to note that, in addition to being related by a formal standard of equivalence (e.g. (a) or (b)),
two equivalent theories would at least need to be ‘empirically equivalent’, which means that the
objects (models) of the formally equivalent categories should represent the same empirical data
(i.e. the empirical data that would be accessible if the physical state of affairs represented by
the models were actual). In the context of the restricted U(1) gauge theory that we discuss in
Section 3 of this paper, we follow the physicists’ standard practice of identifying the empirical
content of a field model with its force field F . As we will describe below, the assumption of
empirical equivalence places an additional constraint on the functors that relate two categorical
representations of U(1) gauge theory.
2.2.2 Inequivalence
Finally, there are cases in which it is fruitful to consider relations between theories that have
different amounts of structure; in the context of this paper, such a scenario is provided by
our analysis of ‘surplus structure’. By hypothesis, there will be no categorical equivalence
between such theories, but one might still try to quantify such differences by means of functorial
relationships between theories.
Within the mathematical literature, there is a long tradition of describing such relationships
by means of ‘forgetful functors’ between categories. More recently, Baez et al. [2004] have
offered a more refined taxonomy of ‘forgetfulness’ in order to facilitate applications to categorical
algebraic topology; we will find it convenient to apply this taxonomy to the analysis of ‘surplus’
within our less sophisticated setting.15 In order to understand Baez et al.’s taxonomy, first
recall some textbook terminology concerning a functor G : C→ D:
• G is full if and only if for all objects A,B in C, the map (induced by G) from hom(A,B)
to hom(G(A), G(B))—i.e. GA→B : hom(A,B)→ hom(G(A),G(B))—is surjective.
• G is faithful if and only if for all A,B ∈ C, GA→B is injective.
• G is essentially surjective if and only if for every object X in D, there is an object A in C
such that G(A) is isomorphic to X.
There exists a G : C→ D which is full, faithful, and essentially surjective if and only if C and D
are categorically equivalent.16
Now, a´ la Baez et al., if G fails to have at least one of these properties then G is a forgetful
functor. If G fails to be full then it forgets structure*, if it fails to be faithful then it forgets
stuff, and if it fails to be essentially surjective then it forgets properties.17 Thus, relative to a
choice of functor, when comparing two categories C and D we can say that if G fails to be full
then C has more structure* than D; if G fails to be faithful then C has more properties than D;
and if G fails to be essentially surjective, then C has more stuff than D.
15One reason for this convenience is that it will allow us to compare our approach to [Weatherall, 2016b, pp. 1042-3],
which also borrows Baez et al.’s taxonomy in order to discuss ‘gauge’.
16Notice that the left-hand-side of this biconditional is an existential claim. That there exists such a functor does
not entail that every functor between the categories is full, faithful, and essentially surjective. Equivalently, that there
exists a forgetful functor between the categories does not entail that they are not categorically equivalent.
17Note that we wish to reserve the term ‘structure’ for the intuitive or pre-theoretical notion of structure, and so
we introduce ‘structure*’ as a term of art that replaces Baez et al’s use of ‘structure’ to refer to the functorial notion.
Thus, when we speak of a functor G : C→ D forgetting structure*, we are not claiming that this captures the intuitive
idea that C, or the scientific theory represented by C, has ‘more structure’ than the theory represented by D. We leave
open the possibility that a functor that forgets stuff or properties may also demonstrate that the domain category
has more ‘structure’ in some intuitive sense than the codomain category.
6
3 Gauge Theory as a Category
3.1 Gauge theory on contractible manifolds
When physicists speak of ‘gauge theory’, they typically have in mind Yang-Mills type gauge
theory, of which the prototype is U(1) gauge theory (also known as ‘electromagnetism’). We
have adopted this nomenclature in our paper, and we shall only address the U(1) case for
simplicity. Furthermore, we will treat spacetime as a smooth manifold throughout this paper,
since none of our points turn on the presence of spacetime metric structure.
As we mentioned in Section 1, a gauge theory is a field theory, and fields are typically taken
to possess ‘locality’, in the sense that field configurations on a manifold will be determined by
specifying configurations on a collection of local subregions that ‘cover’ that manifold. However,
in this section, we will only consider a mock-up of field theory that makes two simplifying
assumptions. First, the theory does not represent any facts about locality, and so a model will
simply be a field configuration on the whole of a spacetime. Second, we will only consider models
that are set on contractible manifolds. Both of these assumptions will be removed in Section 4.
What are the fields of a U(1) gauge theory? Physicists typically formulate the theory in
terms of gauge fields, i.e. 1-forms A ∈ Ω1(M, u(1)).18 From a gauge field A, one can define the
force field F := dA, which is invariant under the gauge transformations:
A 7→ A+ g−1dg (1)
where g :M → U(1).19
Note that by definition, the force field F satisfies the source-free equation of motion dF = 0.20
On a contractible manifold M (and assuming that we have no interest in subsystems on non-
contractible subregions of M) the empirical content of the theory can be expressed solely in
terms of the gauge-invariant fields F ; whence familiar worries about ‘surplus’ when the theory
is formulated in terms of the gauge fields A.
We now turn to the articulation of a U(1) gauge theory on M as a category. Since such
a theory represents states of affairs on a particular spacetime M , we will adopt the standard
practice of fixing M , and taking a model to be a field configuration on M .21 Thus, a category
of models will be a category whose objects are such gauge fields, and whose morphisms (if we
should choose to include them) are symmetries of the relevant fields.
A specific category of this kind that has been widely used in the mathematical physics
literature is the groupoid of gauge fields CA. CA is a groupoid—that is not a categorical set or
equivalence relation—whose objects are the gauge fields A ∈ Ω1(M, u(1)), and whose morphisms
are the gauge transformations given by (1).
3.2 Other candidates for representing U(1) gauge theory
Although CA is one of the standard categorical representations of gauge theory within physics, it
has scarcely been discussed within the philosophical literature.22 On the other hand, several al-
ternative candidate categories for representing gauge theory have been discussed by Weatherall
18For an introduction to gauge fields, see [Pokorski, 2000, Chapter 1].
19Throughout this paper we use the mathematicians’ convention; the typical physicists’ convention would denote
the gauge transformation as A 7→ A− ig−1dg.
20There is also a dual source-free equation of motion d ∗ F = 0, but we will not use it in this paper.
21For more details of the standard modelling practice, see [Benini et al., 2015, Section 2]. In Section 4 we will
discuss how to assign field configurations to varying manifolds.
22For some exceptions, see (Dougherty, forthcoming) and Teh, forthcoming)
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[2016a,b], in conjunction with a particular proposal for understanding ‘surplus’. We now con-
sider (simplified versions of) these alternative categories and proceed to develop an analysis
of ‘surplus’ which identifies CA as possessing the relevant ‘surplus’ structure; we then briefly
contrast our proposal with that of Weatherall [2016b].23
Alternative representations of gauge theory are given by the following groupoids:
• SF is the categorical set whose objects are force fields F ∈ Ω
2(M, u(1)) and all of whose
morphisms are identities.24
• SA is the categorical set whose objects are gauge fields A ∈ Ω
1(M, u(1)), and all of whose
morphisms are identities.
• S[A] is the categorical set whose objects are (gauge) equivalence classes [A] and all of whose
morphisms are identities.
• EA is the categorical equivalence relation whose objects are gauge fields A ∈ Ω
1(M, u(1))
and whose morphisms are given by the gauge transformations A 7→ A + λ, where λ is a
closed 1-form, i.e. dλ = 0 (thus, we know from (1) that λ = g−1dg for some g).25 Note
that it follows from this definition that the only automorphism of A is the trivial one, i.e.
λ = 0.
We note that while the physically-minded reader may rightly chafe at the definition of EA (why
arbitrarily omit from (1) all automorphisms but the trivial one?), we will provide a mathematical
explanation for this choice in Section 5, albeit one that will be at odds with our (physical)
motivations.
In order to give the reader some visual intuition for these definitions, Figure 1 provides an
illustration of these groupoids and CA. Notice that boxes (a)-(c) and (e) only contain identity
automorphisms, whereas box (d) also contains non-trivial automorphisms.26 This last feature
explains why box (c) contains exactly two arrows between distinct objects in the same cluster,
whereas box (d) contains many such arrows (though not explicitly depicted, this is implied by
concatenating non-trivial automorphisms with the depicted arrows).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
We are now in a position to consider the functorial relationships between these different
theories. In light of our discussion of empirical equivalence at the end of Section 2.2.1, we will
only consider functors that satisfy the following criterion:
Empirical Equivalence of U(1) Theories: Fix a contractible manifold M . We will
say that two categorical representations C and D of U(1) gauge theory on M are
empirically equivalent if and only if for each model X ∈ C (which can be a gauge
field, equivalence class of gauge fields, or force field depending on the category in
23This simplification derives from omitting spacetime isomorphisms, since for our purposes we focus exclusively on
the field structure of U(1) gauge theory, which, in this section, is distinguished from its metric structure by keeping
the background manifold and metric fixed and identifying models with n-forms (or constructions thereof) and the
morphisms with the maps between them.
24Recall two points: First, since F is a force field, it is closed, i.e. dF = 0. Second, since we are assuming that M
is contractible, Poincare’s Lemma implies that for every F there is a non-unique A ∈ Ω1(M, u(1)) such that dA = F .
25The definition of EA comes from the category EM2 in [Weatherall, 2016a, pp.1082-3], but where we have omitted
spacetime isometries since these will not be relevant for our purposes.
26Explicitly, the non-trivial automorphisms contained in CA correspond to shifts by a (non-zero) constant function,
which in turn give rise to the ‘rigid’ or ‘global’ U(1) symmetries of electromagnetism, i.e. the (non-trivial) constant
maps g :M → U(1). It is now clear why physicists typically take CA to be the ‘physical category’: when one couples
U(1) gauge theory to the matter sector (e.g. scalar or fermion fields), these rigid transformations are used to construct
non-trivial conserved charges by means of Noether’s (first) theorem. By contrast (and putting aside boundary terms),
only trivial charges can be associated with the non-constant maps.
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question) with a force field F (either induced by F := dA, or explicitly defined in
the model) there is a model Y ∈ D with the same F , and vice versa for each Y ∈ D.
We thus say that a pair of functors G : C → D and H : D → C realises an empirical
equivalence if and only if for every model (object) X in C there is a model Y in the
image of G with the same force field F , and vice versa for every model Y ∈ D and
the image of H .
In other words, such functors must act in one of the following ways on the categories in Figure
1: they take a gauge field A to a force field F such that F = dA (and vice versa); they take an
equivalence class of gauge fields [A] to a gauge field A such that A ∈ [A] (and vice versa); and
finally, they take an equivalence class of gauge fields [A] to a force field F such that F = dA for
all A ∈ [A] (and vice versa).
For our purposes, it will suffice to consider the following empirical equivalence-realising
functors:27
G: SA → S[A] such that for all A in SA: G(A) = [A] where A ∈ [A]; identities are
sent to identities.
H: SF → S[A] such that for all F in SF : H(F ) = [A] where F = dA for all A ∈ [A];
identities are sent to identities.
I: S[A] → EA such that for all [A] in S[A]: I([A]) = a representative A of [A]; identities
are sent to identities.28
J: EA → S[A] such that for all A in EA: J(A) = [A] where A ∈ [A]; and for all A,B
in EA such that J(A) = J(B): hom(J(A), J(B)) = {1J(A)}.
K: S[A] → CA such that for all [A] in S[A]: K([A]) = some A in CA such that A ∈ [A];
identities are sent to identities.
τ : CA → S[A] such that for all A in CA : τ (A) = [A] where A ∈ [A]; and for all A,B
in CA such that τ (A) = τ (B),hom(τ (A), τ (B)) = {1τ(A)}.
M : S[A] → SA such that for all [A] in S[A]: M([A]) = some A in SA such that A ∈ [A];
identities are sent to identities.
Since these functors realise empirical equivalences, the categories in Figure 1 are all empiri-
cally equivalent to each other. We now turn to the further inter-theoretic relationships encoded
by these functors, as depicted in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
First, there are (formal) equivalences, as represented in the vertical axis of Figure 2, where
∼= denotes categorical isomorphism and ≃ denotes categorical equivalence. It is easy to see
that H and its inverse demonstrate that SF and S[A] are isomorphic (cf. [Weatherall, 2016a, p.
1082]). Similarly, I and J are quasi-inverse functors which demonstrate that S[A] and EA are
categorically equivalent (but non-isomorphic).
Notice that this equivalence is simply a special case of what we called (Skel) in Section
2.2.1, and in particular, of the fact that a categorical equivalence relation (EA) is equivalent to
a categorical set (S[A] and SF ).
Next, there are inequivalences, as represented in the horizontal axis of Figure 2. The follow-
ing propositions show that G,K, τ and M are all forgetful functors which encode differences in
the structure of theories CA, S[A](∼= SF ≃ EA), and SA (see the Appendix for the proofs):
27Note that the actions on the morphisms by G,H, I,K and M are determined by the definition of a functor since
the only morphisms in the domain categories are identities.
28Note that this functor lacks naturality (in the choice of the representative of the equivalence class). The same
applies to K and M .
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Proposition 3.2.1. G forgets (only) structure*. So, with respect to G, SA has more structure*
than S[A].
Proposition 3.2.2. K forgets (only) structure*. So, with respect to K, S[A] has more structure*
than CA.
Proposition 3.2.3. τ forgets (only) stuff. So, with respect to τ , CA has more stuff than S[A].
Proposition 3.2.4. M forgets (only) properties. So, with respect toM , S[A] has more properties
than SA.
In the next subsection we discuss how these forgetful relationships correspond to the notion
of ‘surplus’ structure.
3.3 Surplus and inter-theoretical comparisons
Within philosophy, the terms ‘surplus’ structure or ‘descriptive fluff’ have been used to refer to
features of gauge theory that seem to play no representational role in theory (cf. [Earman, 2004;
Redhead, 2003]). And although physicists tend not to use either of these terms, it is extremely
common for them to claim that ‘gauge symmetry is a redundancy, because it relates gauge
fields that represent the same physical state’ and that it is the ‘gauge equivalence classes’ that
capture the non-redundant physical data (the references for this view are too many to list, but
see especially [Tong, 2006, Section 6.1.1], [Alvarez-Gaume and Vazquez-Mozo, 2011, p.64], and
[Sundermeyer, 2014, p.497]). Thus, the notion of ‘surplus’ structure or ‘redundancy’ that we are
after applies to theories in which (i) gauge fields corresponding to the same F are represented as
representationally equivalent, and (ii) the gauge symmetries are included as part of the structure
that is ‘surplus’. While in Section 4 we argue that this notion of ‘surplus’ does in fact play a
representational role when one adopts a sufficiently rich conception of ‘gauge theory’, for now
we will only be concerned with the question of how precisely to understand ‘surplus’ within a
simplified setting. As a rough first pass, we might say that a theory with ‘surplus’ structure is
one that includes the gauge symmetries—understood as isomorphisms—as part of the theory
(thus satisfying (i)), and whose structure is in some still-to-be-precisified sense ‘surplus’ with
respect to a theory that only includes the gauge equivalence classes (thus satisfying (ii)). In
other words, such a theory satisfies
(Surplus): A (gauge) theory has ‘surplus structure’ (which includes the gauge fields
and gauge symmetries) over and above its gauge equivalence classes.29
How can this intuitive notion of (Surplus) be precisified by means of categorical tools? As
we see it, the ‘theories as categories’ paradigm allows us to provide a four-fold precisifiation of
what it means for a theory to have ‘structure over and above its gauge equivalence classes’.
First, we use categories to represent the two theories that we are comparing: a theory
whose field content involves only gauge equivalence classes, and a theory that is a candidate for
having (Surplus) structure. We thus take S[A] to represent the former, whereas the latter can
be represented by either CA, EA, or SA.
Second, our target concept of ‘surplus’ applies to theories that use gauge symmetries to
encode relations of representational equivalence between gauge fields. Since SA does not include
these symmetries, it is not the appropriate category for capturing the content of (Surplus).
Consequently, our focus will be restricted to comparisons between S[A] (the theory that does
not satisfy (Surplus)) and either CA or EA (the candidate theories that satisfy (Surplus)).
29Note that this is essentially the formulation given in [Redhead, 2003].
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Third, once we have represented theories as categories, we will need to settle on a standard
of sameness for theories (thus disambiguating an aspect of what is meant by ‘over and above’ in
(Surplus)). If categorical isomorphism is our standard, then we obtain what one might think of
as the ‘naive’ reading of (Surplus), on which EA counts as having ‘surplus’ over and above the
gauge equivalence classes of S[A]. However, as we argued earlier, there are strong methodological
reasons for picking categorical equivalence as our standard. We will thus make this choice, and
so EA will count as ‘the same theory’ as S[A]. Consequently, the only candidate category which
satisfies (Surplus) is CA.
Fourth, we perform a functorial comparison between CA and S[A] that will clarify the ‘surplus’
structure that CA possesses over and above S[A]. Such a comparison is the content of Prop. 3.2.3
(and the left arm of Figure 2), which tells us that the forgetful truncation functor τ : CA → S[A]
forgets stuff in Baez et al.’s taxonomy of forgetfulness.30
This four-fold precisification of ‘surplus’ structure allows us to define surplus* structure as
the stuff that is forgotten by the functor τ . This provides the following characterisation of what
it means for a U(1) gauge theory to have such structure:
(Surplus*): A (gauge) theory contains the stuff that is forgotten by τ (namely the
non-trivial automorphisms of the gauge fields and the result of concatenating them
with the morphisms already included in EA).
31
It is worth pausing briefly to contrast our notion of ‘surplus’ with the rather different concept
that is being analysed in [Weatherall, 2016b] (albeit also under the heading ‘surplus’), where
we will omit spacetime isometries from the latter’s categories since we are only concerned with
gauge structure. First, note that both accounts hold that the theory without ‘surplus’ (in each
respective sense) is S[A], and both take categorical equivalence to be the correct standard of
sameness for theories. The key difference between these accounts lies in their respective target
notions of ‘surplus’. On the one hand, we are interested in a notion of ‘surplus’ that is possessed
by theories which take gauge fields to be representationally equivalent (and which represent
this by means of gauge transformations between gauge fields); thus, CA is our candidate for
such a theory and ‘surplus’ is characterised by the stuff -forgetting functor τ : CA → S[A]
(cf. the left arm of Fig. 2). By contrast, Weatherall’s notion of ‘surplus’ applies to a theory
that does not represent gauge fields as representationally equivalent, namely SA (which has no
gauge transformations between objects and is essentially a set). Thus, his notion of ‘surplus’ is
characterised by the structure*-forgetting functor G : SA → S[A] (cf. the right arm of Fig. 2),
which intuitively ‘forgets the lack of arrows between objects’.32
We take no issue with Weatherall’s account as an attempt to compare the objects of SA
(which is essentially a set) with S[A]. However, from the point of view of physical practice, there
are at least two good reasons to focus on CA and its comparison with SA. First, and as we men-
tioned earlier (cf. fn. 26), CA—but not S[A] or SA—contains the global gauge transformations
30Here, one familiar interpretation of stuff as ‘entities within the objects that can be equipped with struc-
ture’ does not apply because we are not dealing with categories which are structured sets. However, the ‘struc-
ture/stuff/properties’ distinctions are relevant beyond the case of structured sets, and are standardly used in categori-
cal algebraic topology, for which we refer the reader to [Baez and Shulman, 2007]. For a general account of truncation,
see [Lurie, 2009].
31To see clearly why it is the non-trivial automorphisms that are important, it is useful to compare the skeleton
skCA—which is categorically equivalent to CA—to S[A]; the key difference is precisely the presence of the non-trivial
automorphisms.
32 More generally, one way of motivating the focus on SA as a candidate category for possessing ‘surplus’ is to
adopt a conception of structure that focuses on the structure of objects of a category, and uses the morphisms to
track how much structure these objects have. An implicit maxim guiding such an approach is something like: the
more isomorphisms in a category, the less (relevant) structure its objects have, because isomorphisms are structure-
preserving maps; the more there are, the less structure there is to preserve.
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(constant maps g :M → U(1)) which are responsible for (non-trivial) charge conservation when
a U(1) gauge theory is coupled to matter fields. Second, and as we will argue in the next section,
the surplus* structure of CA is required in order to explain the oft-cited conceptual connection
between the ‘redundancies’ of a gauge theory, on the one hand, and the ‘locality’ of the theory,
on the other.
4 Gauge Theory as a Functor
4.1 (Richness) and (Locality)
In this section, we return to the puzzle that we raised in the introduction: how can ‘surplus’
structure be an essential feature of a theory? Roughly speaking, our strategy for resolving this
puzzle will be to argue that in order to represent ‘locality’ (i.e. a property of field theory, as it is
standardly conceived) the notion of theory in Section 3 needs to be extended to a more general
context; from the perspective of this generalisation, surplus* structure is required in order to
represent a rich set of physically relevant models that possess locality.
More carefully now, recall that the formulation of a ‘theory as a category’ in Section 3 rested
on two simplifying assumptions: (i) we only considered fields set on contractible regions; and
(ii) we ignored ‘locality’ by taking such regions to be entire spacetimes. Recall too that our
precisification of ‘surplus’, i.e. surplus*, was predicated on this narrow notion of a ‘theory’.
In Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, we will consider how removing (i) and (ii) suggests a move to a
broader functorial notion of ‘theory’, which is not merely a collection of models, but rather a
uniform assignment of collections of models to different spacetimes (including subregions of a
spacetime).
The motivation for lifting (i) is:
(Richness): Gauge theories have a rich set of physically relevant ‘topological soliton’
solutions, which are defined on non-contractible manifolds.
The use of the term ‘physically relevant’ here covers the spectrum of empirical and theoretical
roles that such solutions play in contemporary physics.33 On the empirical side: many soli-
tons (instantons in Yang-Mills theory; vortices in condensed matter physics) are used to make
predictions about models of field theory. And on the theoretical side, solitons are even more
pervasive: for instance, many field-theoretic dualities make essential use of soliton solutions.
Thus, any philosophically adequate analysis of gauge theories must take into account the rich-
ness of their solitonic models. Since the ‘theories as categories’ of Section 3 were only defined
on contractible manifolds, they do not in themselves have the resources to capture (Richness);
however, Section 4.1.1 will introduce the machinery of principal G-bundles that allows us to do
so. Furthermore, Section 4.1.2 will introduce a notion of ‘gluing’ that forges a link between the
‘theories as categories’ of Section 3 and (Richness).
The motivation for lifting (ii) is the fact that field theories are typically taken to possess:
(Locality): All physically relevant global models (i.e. field configurations on an
arbitrary spacetime M) are determined by ‘compatibly gluing’ a set of local models
(i.e. field configurations on contractible subregions Ui of M , where {Ui} is a cover
of M).
In other words, (Locality) is a constraint that relates the physically relevant global models on
M to a family of ‘theories as categories’ (whose objects are local models), where the family is
parameterised by contractible subregions of M .
33See [Manton and Sutcliffe, 2004] for an overview of (classical) topological soliton solutions.
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By itself, (Locality) does not tell us what the physically relevant global models are. How-
ever, (Richness) helps specify this class of models, and as argued below, when (Richness) and
(Locality) are conjoined they imply (Surplus*), thus showing how ‘surplus’ structure can be an
essential feature of theories that are rich enough to combine three aspects: one can represent
global models (i.e. topological solitons); one can represent local models (i.e. models of the sort
considered in Section 3); and one can represent the relationship between local and global models
(i.e. how the former can be combined to yield the latter).
In order to mount this argument more precisely, we will now proceed to describe the cat-
egorical formulation of (Richness) and (Locality). While this is a subject matter about which
one can be exceedingly abstract, we will focus on a concrete and elementary example for U(1)
gauge theory: the Dirac monopole on the sphere M = S2.
4.1.1 Representing (Richness)
The global ‘topological soliton’ models that exemplify (Richness) are standardly defined by
means of the machinery of a principal G-bundle with connection.34 For instance, in the our focal
case of U(1) gauge theory, (Richness) requires that we take into account the Dirac monopole
model, which is a U(1)-bundle P equipped with a connection 1-form ω over the sphere S2.
Such global models can be understood as combining two pieces of data: (i) a topological charge
that corresponds to the isomorphism class of P ; and (ii) a particular connection ω on P (up to
connection-preserving bundle isomorphism). In the Dirac monopole case, it will be particularly
useful for us to view the monopole’s global force field F ∈ Ω2(S2, u(1)) as a summary of (i) and
(ii): F is constructed from the bundle’s curvature dω, and by a standard result from Chern-Weil
theory, the cohomology class of F corresponds to the topological charge of the monopole (and
thus to the isomorphism class of P ).35
Due to a classical result by Steenrod [1951], we know that isomorphism classes of principal
G-bundles over M are in bijection with homotopy classes of maps from M into the classifying
space BG of the group G. Thus, in cases where the classifying space BG is well-understood,
homotopy classes of maps provide a useful classification of the possible topological charges of a
soliton model. Applying this result to this case of the Dirac monopole, we see that the principal
U(1)-bundles P over S2 are in bijection with [S2, BU(1) = CP∞] = pi2(CP
∞) ∼= Z. Thus, the
topological charge of a Dirac monopole model is n ∈ Z. The charge is also known as the ‘first
Chern number’ of the model since it can be computed as n = 1
2pi
∫
S2
F , where F represents the
first Chern class of P .
In order to speak of a collection of global models on M , it is standard practice to define
the functor Bun : Man → Grpd, which assigns to any M (not necessarily contractible) the
groupoid Bun(M) whose objects are principal U(1)-bundles overM with connection (P, ω), and
whose morphisms are connection-preserving bundle isomorphisms over the identity on M . In
particular, Bun(S2) contains all the Dirac monopole models of U(1) gauge theory. We note that
while one could say that we are still within the ‘theories as categories’ paradigm since Bun(M)
is a category (for a fixed M), this observation misses the point of the functorial perspective on
(Richness): our theory assigns global models to arbitrary M (and regions of M) in a uniform
manner.36
34A principal G-bundle is a fibre bundle pi : P → M with a continuous right action by the group G on the total
space P which preserves fibres.
35Here we note a technical subtlety: The first (integral) Chern class of a U(1)-bundle on M is a complete invariant
of the bundle’s isomorphism class, but when we represent it by F , we are omitting possible torsion information in
this class. In the case where the connection is flat, such torsion data corresponds precisely to the monodromies that
account for the Aharanov-Bohm effect, cf. footnote 45.
36The relevant sense of ‘uniformity’ here includes the preservation of the pattern of morphisms between objects in
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What is the relationship between Bun(M) (and thus the Dirac monopole models) and the
previously mentioned groupoid of gauge fields CA (onM)? Such a relationship is easy enough to
specify in the case whereM is contractible: Bun(M) and CA are then equivalent as categories.
37
However, for non-contractible M , the relationship between Bun(M) and CA becomes more
complicated, because the groupoid of gauge fields CA is only defined on contractible manifolds.
38
And since the Dirac monopole model requires a non-contractible M = S2, we will need to
forge a more subtle relationship between Bun(M) and CA if we are to connect the ‘theories
as categories’ paradigm—and thus (Surplus*)—to the Dirac monopole models which exemplify
(Richness). Representing such a relationship is required by (Locality), which we now proceed
to discuss.
4.1.2 Representing (Locality)
Recall that (Locality) requires that every physically relevant global model on a (possibly non-
contractible) manifold M is determined by ‘compatibly gluing’ some family of local models
parametrised by the contractible cover {Ui} of M . For U(1) gauge theory, a local model on Ui
is contained in one of the ‘theories as categories’ of Section 3. Thus, from a categorical point
of view, the most natural way to conceptualise this ‘family of categories’ parametrised by {Ui}
is by representing theories as functors that assign the categories of Section 3 to contractible
subregions Ui ⊆ M .
39 Functoriality is important here because the ‘theory functors’ capture
the relationship between ‘relations between regions of spacetime’ and ‘possible gluing relations
between models on those regions’.40
We will define such functors by extending the ‘theory as a category’ notation of the previous
section in the following way. Suppose we previously used CT to denote a groupoid of models for
T for some fixed contractible manifold M . Abusing notation, we now use CT : Man
c© → Grpd
to denote a functor from the category of contractible manifolds to the category of groupoids,
which assigns that groupoid of models to M . Thus, in this new notation, SF : Man
c© → Grpd
takes an arbitrary contractible manifold M to the categorical set SF (M); mutatis mutandis for
the functors EA and CA.
41 We can now give a preliminary formulation of (Locality) in these
terms: it is the requirement that any physically relevant global model in Bun(M) (where M
is possibly non-contractible) can be constructed by ‘compatibly gluing’ some collection of local
the functor’s domain. See also the discussion of ‘uniformity’ and its relationship with ‘canonicity’ in Section 3.4 of
[Teh and Tsementzis, 2017].
37This equivalence works by mapping A ∈ Ω1(M, u(1)) to the trivial bundle M × U(1) with connection ω :=
p1∗A+ p2∗m, where m ∈ Ω1(U(1), u(1)) is the Maurer-Cartan form, and p1 : M × U(1)→ M,p2 : M × U(1)→ U(1)
are projection maps. (Explicitly, the Maurer-Cartan form is obtained by taking for any g ∈ U(1),mg(v) := (Lg)
−1
∗ (v),
where v ∈ TgU(1), and Lg : U(1) → U(1) is left multiplication by g.) Since every connection on M × U(1) is of
this form, we have the desired bijection between Ω1(M, u(1)) and connection forms on trivial principal U(1)-bundles.
Furthermore, since all principal bundles over contractible M are trivial, we have the desired categorical equivalence
between Bun(M) and CA.
38One could consider defining CA(M) for non-contractible M , but this would depend on the cohomology of M and
in general could give only the trivial solution; in other words, in general there is no non-trivial global gauge field
defined on non-contractible M .
39Below we will only describe the action of such functors on objects; for the issue of how such functors are defined
on morphisms, we refer the reader to [Benini et al., 2015].
40We note that one could again claim to be describing this data within the ‘theories as categories’ framework by
fixing spacetime regions and adding the relevant relationships by hand, but this would be nothing other than an
implicit appeal to functoriality.
41Notice that this ‘theories as functors’ paradigm includes the ‘theories as categories’ paradigm as a special case:
to recover the latter, we simply fix a contractible M on which to evaluate the functors. By highlighting the functorial
aspect we want to emphasise the significance of being able to consider varying background spacetimes. It is this
feature which is significant when dealing with the locality of a theory.
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models {Ai ∈ CT (Ui)}, where {Ui} is a contractible open cover of M .
To go further, we will need to articulate the notion of ‘compatible gluing’ that relates global
models to some collection of local models. While there are various abstract and technical ways
of precisifying this notion, it will suffice for our purposes to provide an elementary description
of gluing for U(1) gauge theory.42 Suppose that we have two contractible regions U1, U2 with
non-trivial intersection U12 := U1 ∩ U2, and let A1 ∈ CT (U1) and A2 ∈ CT (U2) be a pair of
local models over each region.43 We then define the groupoid CT (U12) by taking its objects to
be models in CT (Ui) (where i = 1, 2) restricted to U12 and its morphisms to be the morphisms
in CT (Ui) which are similarly restricted.
44 We say that the local models A1 and A2 can be
‘compatibly glued’ if and only if there is at least one morphism in CT (U12) between A1|U12 and
A2|U12 . A choice of gluing is thus a choice of morphism that relates the local models on U12;
as we will soon see in the case of the Dirac monopole, we will be particularly interested in the
homotopy class determined by such a choice.
We can now articulate the notion of U(1) gauge theory for which it makes sense to say
that ‘the theory satisfies (Locality)’ with respect to the theories of Section 3. Such an expanded
theory has three elements: (i) it represents global models by means of a ‘global theory’ Bun( · );
(ii) it represents local models by means of a ‘local theory’ CT ( · ); and (iii) it represents global-
local relationships such as (Locality)—or lack thereof—by means of CT (Uij) for all non-trivial
overlapping regions Uij .
We now have a formulation of (Locality) that applies to a general M . In our subsequent
discussion of the Dirac monopole, it will be advantageous to use a less general formulation that
makes explicit reference to the monopole’s global force field F ∈ Ω2(S2, u(1)).45 We will say that
an expanded theory satisfies F -(Locality) if and only if the force fields F of any of its physically
relevant global models can be constructed by taking some collection of local models—one from
each CT (Ui)—whose fields gives rise to F |Ui , and compatibly gluing these over the non-trivial
overlaps {Uij}.
It should now be evident that the structure of the morphisms in the local theories SA,EA,CA
(now viewed as functors) of Section 3 place stringent constraints on the extent to which an
expanded theory can satisfy (Locality). Without yet introducing any assumptions about what
the physically relevant global solutions of a theory should be, let us consider the implications
of taking each of these categories to provide a collection of local models.
First, let us consider local models coming from SA. Recall that each SA(Ui) is a categorical
set whose objects are fields A ∈ Ω1(Ui, u(1)) and whose only morphisms are the identities.
Thus, for any two models A1 ∈ SA(U1), A2 ∈ SA(U2) such that F |U12 = dA1|U12 = dA2|U12 , the
restrictions A|Uij , A
′|Uij ∈ SA(Uij), can only be compatibly glued by an identity morphism. In
other words, if we wish to use local models to construct a global force field F on M , we must
be in a situation in which the local gauge fields stem from restricting a global gauge field on
M . But on any manifold with non-trivial de Rham cohomology in degree 2 (e.g. M = S2), no
global gauge field can give rise to a non-trivial force field F . Thus, an expanded theory that
links global models to SA( · ) can only satisfy F -(Locality) with respect to a trivial global
42For an elegant formulation of gluing in terms of homotopy limits, see equation (3.4) of [Benini et al., 2015]. This
more sophisticated perspective further highlights the importance of the ‘theories as functors’ paradigm for field theory:
it allows us to describe a global theory functor as a (higher) limit of a local theory functor.
43For simplicity, we will only deal with a pair of contractible subregions, but the extension to an arbitrary number
of subregions will be straightforward.
44Note that this is not the same thing as applying the functor CT to Uij ; the latter will not in general make sense
because Uij is not necessarily contractible.
45This is less general because it does not suffice to capture Aharanov-Bohm type phenomena, where F = 0 and so
the relevant cohomology classes for the physics stem from non-trivial 1-cycles in the spacetime. But it will suffice for
our purposes, and is at any rate much closer to how physicists intuitively think of the monopole.
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model; in particular, monopoles with non-trivial topological charge cannot be represented in
this way.
On the other hand, in the case of EA (respectively CA), there exist non-automorphism mor-
phisms between A|Uij and A
′|Uij in EA(Uij) (respectively CA(Uij)). Thus, these local theories
have the following feature: the structure of their isomorphisms is rich enough to compatibly
glue distinct local gauge fields which nonetheless give rise to an identical force field on Uij . In
the next section, we will consider the extent to which this feature allows expanded theories to
represent all monopole models while simultaneously satisfying (Locality).
4.2 (Richness) and (Locality) imply (Surplus*)
Recall that our goal in this section was to explain how ‘surplus’ structure—now precisfied as
surplus* structure—can be an essential feature of gauge theory, and our strategy was to advert to
a notion of ‘theory’ that is more faithful to physical practice—and thus incorporates (Richness)
and (Locality)—instead of the simplistic theories of Section 3. In such an ‘expanded theory’,
as we earlier called it, (Richness) is a property of the global models, ‘surplus’ (however one
conceptualises it) is a property of the local models, and (Locality) is a relation between global
models and local models.
Our main claim will be that conjoining (Richness) and (Locality) implies that the relevant
local theory needs to satisfy (Surplus*), i.e. it should be CA. Hence our slogan that (Richness)
and (Locality) imply (Surplus*).
We begin by giving a more abstract argument for the converse of our main claim: an ex-
panded theory that has CA as its local theory simultaneously satisfies (Richness) and (Locality).
(Richness) tells us that our theory should include as a global model any (P, ω) ∈ Bun(M),
and so conjoining it with (Locality) yields the requirement that for any (P, ω), there exists a
collection of local models {Ai ∈ CT (Ui)} that can be compatibly glued to yield (P, ω). It will
be straightforward to see that this requirement is satisfied for CT = CA if we note that any
(P, ω) has the following ‘local’ description: given some contractible cover {Ui} of M , P can
be described by patching together the bundle charts {Ui × U(1)} by means of the ‘cocycles’
hij : Uij → U(1) (for any non-trivial overlap Uij); similarly, ω can be described by patching
together ωi := ω|pi−1(Ui), where pi : P → M is the bundle projection map.
46 Let {Ai} be
a collection of local models (i.e. gauge fields) along with some choice of gluing (i.e. gauge
transformations)
Aj = Ai + g
∗
ijm = Ai + g
−1
ij dgij (2)
for all i, j, where we have emphasized the role of the Maurer-Cartan form m. To see that any
(P, ω) can be reconstructed from some {Ai} along with a choice of gluing, we now make two
observations. First, by setting gij = hij for all i, j, our choice of gluing {gij} yields precisely the
cocycle data that defines P (up to isomorphism); in other words, the gauge transformations in
CA encode the structure that allows us to reconstruct any P . Second, any connection ω on P can
be reconstructed (up to gauge transformations) by choosing {Ai} such that ωi = pi
∗Ai + p
∗
2m,
where p2 is the projection map Ui × U(1)→ U(1).
47
This line of reasoning also indicates why one should expect our main claim to be true. For
suppose that the relevant local theory CT does not meet (Surplus*), i.e. it is one of S[A], SF or
46More precisely, the prinicpal bundle pi : P →M is given by taking the quotient space P := (∐Ui×U(1))/ ∼ where
the equivalence relation identifies (x, g) ∈ Ui×U(1) with (x, hij(x)g) ∈ Uj×U(1). The maps φ : pi−1(Ui)→ Ui×U(1)
given by [xi, g] 7→ (xi, g) for xi ∈ Ui are the local trivializations of P → M , and the maps hij are the transition
functions between these local trivializations.
47For a proof of this reconstruction as well as the general equivalence between (P, ω) and a gluing of local models,
see [Sontz, 2015, Thm 14.4].
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EA, and thus does not contain the additional morphisms (stuff, cf. Prop. 3.2.3) contained in CA.
Then, since the isomorphism class of P is determined by its cocycle data, and since (as we have
just argued) the cocycle data is contained in the morphisms of CA, it is reasonable to expect
that it will not be possible to reconstruct an arbitrary P from a local theory whose morphisms
are less rich than those of CA. In fact, this is exactly what happens, and we shall now provide a
more incisive argument for this conclusion in the case of the Dirac monopole, for which it will
be expedient to formulate (Locality) in terms of the monopole’s global force field F .
In the Dirac monopole case, M = S2, take the open cover of M to be the contractible
regions U1 = S
2 \ {s} and U2 = S
2 \ {n}, i.e. the sphere with the south and north pole
removed, respectively. In this context, the conjunction of (Richness) and F -(Locality) amounts
to the requirement that the global force field F of any monopole model can be determined by
compatibly gluing some pair of local models from CT (U1) and CT (U2). We will now argue that
if CT does not have surplus* structure, then this requirement cannot be satisfied; furthermore,
we will only focus on the case of EA since, as we discussed at the end of Section 4.1.2, SA only
contains enough information to reconstruct the trivial monopole.
We begin by considering how the isomorphism class (of the principal bundle P ) of an ar-
bitrary monopole can be reconstructed from CA by compatibly gluing a pair of local models
A1 ∈ CA(U1) and A2 ∈ CA(U2), i.e. by means of some gauge transformation A1 = A2+g
−1
12 dg12,
where g12 : U12 ≃ S
1 → U(1) ∼= S1. In order to see how this works, it will be especially useful to
recall from Section 4.1.1 that this isomorphism class corresponds to the monopole’s topological
charge n ∈ Z, which can in turn be computed from its global force field F by means of the
formula n = 1
2pi
∫
S2
F . Then, through a judicious application of Stoke’s theorem, it is easy to
see that n = 1
2pi
∫
S1
(A1−A2) =
1
2pi
∫
S1
g−112 dg12. This is nothing other than the classical formula
for the winding number (i.e. the number of times g12 winds S
1 around S1), and so we see that
the topological charge of a monopole is determined by the ‘winding’ (or homotopy class) of the
particular choice of gauge transformation in CA(U12) that is used to glue A1 and A2. It follows
that in order to reconstruct monopole models with an arbitrary topological charge, our local
theories need to contain all possible gauge transformations (and thus all possible homotopy
classes), which is precisely the surplus* structure of CA as compared to S[A].
By contrast, if we take EA as our local theory, then there is exactly one gauge transformation
(and thus one possible choice of gluing) in EA(U12) between A1 and A2. Recall from the definition
of EA that this gauge transformation is described as A1 = A2+λ, where λ is a closed 1-form. It
thus follows that the only monopole models that one can construct by gluing local models are
ones with the topological charge n′ = 1
2pi
∫
S1
λ (where n′ is possibly non-zero if λ is non-exact).
To rephrase this crucial point: if the local theory does not have surplus* structure, i.e. the
full set of gauge transformations, then all the other non-trivial monopole models (i.e.those with
topological charge n 6= n′) cannot be constructed by gluing local models; this thus concludes
our argument for the main claim: ‘(Richness) and (Locality) imply (Surplus*)’.
It is worth making two quick observations about this argument. First, we note that the
argument holds up to categorical equivalence of the relevant local theories. In other words, the
conclusion of the argument (it is not possible to simultaneously satisfy (Richness) and (Locality))
would have been the same if we had used SF or S[A] as our local theories instead of EA; and
it would have been the same if we had used skCA instead of CA. Second, we note that one
could of course advocate taking EA as the relevant local theory if one were willing to give up
either (Richness) or (Locality). In other words, one could hold that the other monopole models
are either physically irrelevant, or that they are non-local in the sense that they cannot be
determined by the data of local theories. But by our lights, such a position is not only awkward
but difficult to square with both physical practice and our intuitive understanding of fields as
‘local’ objects.
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Let us now summarise our explanation of the claim that ‘surplus* structure is an essential
feature of gauge theory’. The apparent tension in this statement stems from the idea that the
surplus* structure is redundant structure and thus cannot be essential. Our resolution of this
tension turns on our above distinction between two different notions of ‘theory’. With respect
to the first and limited notion, which we called a ‘local theory’, surplus* structure is indeed
redundant. However, with respect to the second richer and more realistic notion, which we
called an ‘expanded theory’, such structure is necessary in order for the theory to perform the
representational function jointly required by (Richness) and (Locality). Thus, the tension only
arises if one mistakenly tries to shoehorn gauge theory into the mould of the first narrow notion.
5 Conclusion
Recall the motivation for the project of using category theory to represent scientific theories: a
theory’s content is not exhausted by its collection of models; it includes information about the
relationships between models. Category theory is a fruitful tool because it provides a natural
framework in which to explicitly represent this information. For the most part, the philosophi-
cal literature has only implemented this idea by treating a theory as a category, i.e. its models
are represented as objects, and its inter-model relationships are encoded in morphims between
objects. For instance, in the categories of Section 3, the relationship of representational equiva-
lence between models (gauge fields) is encoded in the isomorphisms (gauge transformations) of
the category.
The argument of our paper can be seen as stemming from two related observations. First, as
we explained in Section 3, one important notion of ‘surplus’ in gauge theory applies to theories in
which gauge fields (corresponding to the same F ) are taken to be representationally equivalent,
and the gauge transformations are themselves included as part of the putative redundancies. We
also showed that one can give a categorical analysis of this notion, which we called ‘surplus*’.
Second, representational equivalence is only one kind of inter-model relationship; in order to
capture other relationships such as global-local relationships, it is natural to move to a ‘theories
as functors’ framework, within which the ‘theories as categories’ framework can be embedded. In
the context of gauge theory, such a move can be further motivated by the fact that field theories
are typically taken to possess ‘locality’, a property that can be precisely represented within the
‘theories as functors’ framework. As we argued above, these two observations are related by
the conventional wisdom that there is a tight conceptual link between the ‘surplus’ of gauge
theory and representing the ‘locality’ of fields. Thus, an immediate pay-off of the ‘theories
as functors’ framework is that it allows us to relate gauge theories on various spacetimes in
order to address the following questions: (1) What is the correct analysis of ‘surplus’ for the
‘theories as categories’ of Section 3?, and (2) What is the representational role of this ‘surplus’
in gauge theory more generally? In Section 4, we used this relation to provide an independent
check on our answer to (1), namely (Surplus*), thus confirming that our analysis really is
responsive to desiderata stemming from physical practice, namely the need to simultaneously
satisfy (Richness) and (Locality).
From a broader perspective that concerns the representational content of scientific theories,
our argument here provides more evidence for the benefit of thinking about scientific theories
in category theoretic terms. As we have seen, although it is the objects of the categories
(the models) which directly represent possible systems, the morphisms can also feature in the
representational content of U(1) gauge theory. In particular: they play a role in representing how
subsystems represented by objects of the theories-as-categories of Section 3 can be composed in
the theories-as-functors framework. Consider, for example, the comparison between CA and EA.
The objects in these categories are the same, so it is only the morphisms, in particular the non-
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trivial automorphisms (and morphisms generated by these), which distinguish the two categories.
And yet as our argument in the previous section showed, because of CA’s ability—and EA’s
inability—to adequately represent how the local subsystems compose to form global systems (in
a way that satisfies (Richness) and (Locality)), the theories have inequivalent representational
content.
To conclude, we wish to point out a striking parallel between our discussion of how scientific
theories should be represented—which involves classifying models/theories up to some standard
of sameness—and a far-reaching approach to classification that has been developed within pure
mathematics (especially algebraic geometry). The central concept here is that of a ‘moduli
space’ M of objects (cf. our local models), i.e. a space whose points are in 1-1 correspondence
with isomorphism classes of such objects (thus classifying them in a naive sense), and which is
in addition rich enough to encode the structure of families of such objects over a base space B
(cf. our families of local models parameterised by a contractible cover of M) in the sense that
such families will be in 1-1-correspondence with maps from B to M.48 Despite the fruitfulness
of this notion, it was recognised very early on that such moduli spaces may not exist if the
objects possess non-trivial automorphisms (cf. the non-trivial automorphisms of objects in
CA), because the automorphisms will quite generically lead to various non-trivial families of
objects over B, which will not be classified by maps from B into a candidate M. Two standard
strategies for addressing this problem are: (i) ‘rigidification’, i.e. simply omitting the non-trivial
automorphisms from the objects; and (ii) defining a richer structure called a ‘moduli stack’, in
which one does not merely assign (categorical) sets of objects to regions of the base space, but
rather a groupoid that includes information about the non-trivial automorphisms of the objects,
and thus allows one to keep track of the various non-trivial ways in which they ‘glue’ into families
of objects.
It will be clear from this heuristic discussion that taking EA as one’s local theory constitutes
a rigidification of the models of gauge theory, whereas taking CA as one’s local theory is a key
step in passing to the richer framework of moduli stacks—thus, from a broader mathematical
perspective, one way of phrasing the moral of our philosophical discussion is that, in gauge
theory, there are very strong grounds for thinking of a collection of models as a ‘stack’.49 For all
that, there is still a disanalogy between these pure mathematical strategies and our physically-
motivated discussion. In the mathematical case, to rigidify the objects is merely to simplify
the problem so that one obtains a well-behaved moduli space. By contrast, in our case, to
rigidify the models is to say that one does not care either about representing (Richness), or
about representing (Locality).
Appendix
Proposition 3.2.1. G forgets (only) structure*. So, with respect to G, SA has more structure*
than S[A].
Proof. To see that G is faithful notice that for all A in SA, hom(A,A) = {1A}, so the map
GA→A : hom(A,A) → hom(G(A), G(A)) has to be injective. For all A,A
′ in SA such that
A 6= A′, hom(A,A′) = ∅, and thus GA→A′ is also injective. So G is faithful. To see that G is
essentially surjective notice that every [A] in S[A] is simply an equivalence class of gauge fields,
and as such contains at least one A such that A is in SA and G(A) = [A]. To see that G fails to
48For a history of the development of the ‘moduli space’ concept, see [A’Campo et al., 2016], and for an elementary
introduction that stresses the notion of ‘classification’, see [Ben-Zvi, 2008].
49For a detailed presentation of how to describe a stack of gauge fields, see [Benini et al., 2017].
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be full consider an equivalence class of gauge fields [A] in S[A] that contains distinct gauge fields
A,A′ (which are in SA). Since SA contains only the identity morphisms, hom(A,A
′) = ∅. But,
G(A) = G(A′) = [A], so hom(G(A),G(A′)) = {1[A]}. So the map GA→A′ is not surjective.
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Proposition 3.2.2. K forgets (only) structure*. So, with respect to K, S[A] has more structure*
than CA.
Proof. K is faithful for an analogous reason to G: for every object [A] in S[A], hom([A], [A]) =
{1[A]} and every pair of distinct objects [A] and [A]
′, hom([A], [A]′) = ∅. Thus both K[A]→[A]
and K[A]→[A]′ have to be injective. To see that K is essentially surjective notice that every A
in CA is in some equivalence class [A] in S[A] and is isomorphic to every A
′ which is also in that
equivalence class. So either K([A]) = A, or K([A]) = A′ such that A ∼= A′ in CA. This suffices
to show that K is essentially surjective. To see that K is not full consider an arbitrary [A] in
S[A]. By construction hom([A], [A]) = {1[A]}. But, by the definition of the morphisms in CA
(given by definition (1)), hom(K([A]), K([A])) contains automorphisms which are not 1K([A]).
So the map K[A]→[A] is not surjective.
Proposition 3.2.3. τ forgets (only) stuff. So, with respect to τ , CA has more stuff than S[A].
Proof. τ is essentially surjective for the same reason as G. To see that τ is full we consider an
arbitrary pair of objects A,A′ in CA. If A ≇ A
′ in CA then τ (A) 6= τ (A
′), in which case τA→A′ :
∅→ ∅. If either A = A′, or A ∼= A′ in CA, then τ (A) = τ (A
′), so hom(τ (A), τ (A′)) = {1τ(A)}.
So in each case the map τA→A′ is surjective. To see τ is not faithful consider an arbitrary object
A in CA. By definition (1), hom(A,A) contains automorphisms which are not 1A, and by the
definition of S[A], hom(τ (A), τ (A)) = {1τ(A)}. So the map τA→A is not injective.
Proposition 3.2.4. M forgets (only) properties. So, with respect toM , S[A] has more properties
than SA.
Proof. To see that M is full and faithful note that both the domain and codomain categories
contain only identity morphisms. If [A] 6= [A]′ then M[A]→[A]′ : ∅ → ∅ and if [A] = [A]
′ then
M[A]→[A] : {1[A]} → {1M([A])}; therefore, for every [A], [A]
′ in S[A], M[A]→[A]′ is a bijection.
To see M is not essentially surjective note that by the definition of M , for each [A] in S[A],
M([A]) = some A in SA such that A ∈ [A]. By construction there is also an A
′ 6= A in SA such
that A′ ∈ [A], but hom(A,A′) = ∅. Furthermore, if one takes a distinct equivalence class [A∗]
in S[A] where A
′ /∈ [A∗], then M([A∗]) ≇ A′ in SA. So A
′ is not isomorphic to anything in the
image of M .
Acknowledgements
Authors are listed in alphabetical order, the paper is fully collaborative. We are grateful to two
anonymous referees for useful comments. We would also like to thank Jeremy Butterfield, Bryan
Roberts, Alexander Schenkel, Christopher Schommer-Pries, and Stephan Stolz for helpful dis-
cussions and comments on previous drafts. Thanks also to audiences at the following workshops
and conferences: The Physics Old and New: Historical and Critical Perspectives on Physics
and the Philosophy of Nature at the University of Notre Dame, Symmetries and Asymmetries
in Physics at Leibniz University in Hannover, and the Ninth European Congress of Analytic
Philosophy in Munich.
50Notice that, since SF ∼= S[A], G also shows that SA has more structure* than SF . The proof of Proposition 3.2.1
follows the proof of Proposition 1 in [Weatherall, 2016b, p. 1044-1045]. This should make clear how our S[A] ∼= SF
and SA are analogues of his EM1 and EM2 respectively.
20
James Nguyen
History and Philosophy of Science
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, USA
and
Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, UK
jnguyen4@nd.edu
Nicholas J. Teh
Department of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, USA
nteh@nd.edu
Laura Wells
Department of Mathematics
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, USA
lwells@nd.edu
References
A’Campo, N., Ji, L., and Papadopoulos, A. (2016). On the early history of moduli and te-
ichmu¨ller spaces, https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.07208.
Alvarez-Gaume, L. and Vazquez-Mozo, M. A. (2011). An Invitation to Quantum Field Theory.
Lecture Notes in Physics. Springer, Berlin.
Baez, J., Bartel, T., and Dolan, J. (2004). Property, structure, and stuff,. Quantum
Gravity Seminar, University of California, Riverside, http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/qg-
spring2004/discussion.html.
Baez, J. and Shulman, M. (2007). Lectures on n-categories and cohomology,
https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0608420.
Barnet-Lamb, T. (2005). Minor thesis: from fibered categories to algebraic stacks,
http://people.brandeis.edu/ tbl/minor-thesis.pdf.
Belot, G., Earman, J., Healey, R., Maudlin, T., Nounou, A., and Struyve, W. (2009). Synopsis
and discussion: Philosophy of gauge theory, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4728/.
Ben-Zvi, D. (2008). Moduli spaces. In Gowers, T., Barrow-Green, J., and Leader, I., editors,
The Princeton Companion to Mathematics, pages 408–419. Princeton University Press.
Benini, M., Schenkel, A., and Schreiber, U. (2017). The stack of Yang-Mills fields on Lorentzian
manifolds, https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.01378.
Benini, M., Schenkel, A., and Szabo, R. J. (2015). Homotopy colimits and global observables
in abelian gauge theory. Lett. Math. Phys., 105:1193–1222.
21
Connes, A. (1994). Noncommutative Geometry. Academic Press, San Diego, CA.
Dougherty, J. (forthcoming). Separability in gauge theories. Philosophy of Science.
Earman, J. (2004). Laws, symmetry, and symmetry breaking: Invariance, conservation princi-
ples, and objectivity. Philosophy of Science, 71(5):1227–1241.
Frigg, R. and Nguyen, J. (2016). Scientific representation. In Zalta, E. N., editor, The Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, winter 2016
edition.
Grothendieck, A. (1959/60). Descent technique and theorems of existence in algebraic geometry.
i: G ’in general. descent by flat morphisms. (technique of descent and existence theorems in
algebraic geometry). Sem. Bourbaki 12 (1959/60), No. 190, 29 p. (1960).
Halvorson, H. (2012). What scientific theories could not be. Philosophy of Science, 79(2):183–
206.
Halvorson, H. and Tsementzis, D. (2015). Categories of scientific theories, http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/11923/.
Healey, R. (2007). Gauging What’s Real. Oxford University Press.
Lurie, J. (2009). Higher topos theory, volume 170 of Annals of Mathematics Studies. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Manton, N. and Sutcliffe, P. (2004). Topological Solitons. Cambridge monographs on mathe-
matical physics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Pokorski, S. (2000). Gauge Field Theories. Cambridge Monographs on Mathematical Physics.
Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition.
Redhead, M. (2003). The interpretation of gauge symmetry. In Brading, K. A. and Castellani,
E., editors, Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections, pages 124–139. Cambridge
University Press.
Riehl, E. (2016). Category theory in context. Courier Dover Publications, Mineola, New York.
Schreiber, U. (2016). Higher prequantum geometry, https://arxiv.org/abs/1601.05956.
Sontz, S. (2015). Principal Bundles: The Classical Case. Springer International Publishing,
Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, and London.
Steenrod, N. (1951). The topology of fibre bundles. Princeton Mathematical Series 14. Princeton
University Press.
Sundermeyer, K. (2014). Symmetries in Fundamental Physics. Fundamental Theories of Physics.
Springer International Publishing, Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, and London.
Teh, N. J. (forthcoming). Gauge theory. In Knox, E. and Wilson, A., editors, The Routledge
Companion to the Philosophy of Physics. Routledge.
Teh, N. J. and Tsementzis, D. (2017). Theoretical equivalence in classical mechanics and its
relationship to duality. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 59(Supplement C):44–54.
22
Tong, D. (2006). Quantum field theory. Lecture notes, University of Cambridge Part III
Mathematical Tripos.
Weatherall, J. O. (2016a). Are Newtonian gravitation and geometrized Newtonian gravitation
theoretically equivalent? Erkenntnis, 81(5):1073–1091.
Weatherall, J. O. (2016b). Understanding gauge. Philosophy of Science, 83(5):1039–1049.
Witten, E. (2010). Mirror Symmetry, Hitchin’s Equations, And Langlands Duality. In Freed,
D. S., Hopkins, M. J., and Teleman, C., editors, The Many Facets of Geometry: A Tribute
to Nigel Hitchin, pages 113–128. Oxford University Press.
23
F1
F2
F3 F4
(a) SF
A1
A2 A3 A4
A5 A6
(b) SA
A1
A2 A3 A4
A5 A6
(c) EA
A1
A2 A3 A4
A5 A6
(d) CA
[A]1
[A]2
[A]3 [A]4
(e) S[A]
Figure 1: Categories of Gauge Theories
24
SF
CA S[A] SA
EA
H
−1
τ
≃
∼=
I
H
M
K G
J
Figure 2: Functorial Relationships
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